Publications
- Category: Tax
The writ of mandamus is a procedural instrument provided for in the Federal Constitution to protect citizens against abuse of power or illegality committed by a member of the Public Administration. With this constitutional lawsuit, the aim is to re-establish the legal situation and protect the right of the covered person arbitrarily restricted by an authority.
Faced with so many peculiarities in the handling of the writ of mandamus, there is an important point about whether it is possible to withdraw it at any time, especially after the trial denying the order has been issued and regardless of the agreement of the administrative authority.
Law 12,016/09, which establishes the framework of the writ of mandamus, does not address the issue, such that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) are applicable to the matter.
First of all, it is worth making a distinction between withdrawal and waiver. Withdrawal produces eminently procedural effects, whereas waiver, precisely because it is closely related to the substantive right itself under discussion in the case, receives separate treatment.
If the party in a procedural relationship chooses to withdraw the claim, the effect of this unilateral act is extinguishment of the suit without a resolution of the merits, as provided for in article 485, subsection VIII, of the CPC.[1] This is because, regardless of the reason that led the party to withdraw from the proceeding, such conduct takes on a procedural form, causing only the case itself to cease. That is, there is repercussion only in the procedural field. The substantive right remains intact. In other words, the existing discussion will not be able to affect the underlying substantive right for any purpose. Thus, it is permitted for a private party to file a new lawsuit - writ of mandamus or any other type compatible with the claim made - provided that it is within the deadline for the exercise thereof.
On the other hand, with waiver, the effects arising from such an expression of will affect the underlying substantive right and the party which has granted it recognizes the right of the counterparty, including with retroactive effect. So much so that a trial ratifying the waiver expressed by the party resolves the merits of the case and is equivalent to acceptance of the opposing party's claim. This is the provision of article 487, subsection III, letter 'c' of the CPC.[2]
Faced with the effects that these unilateral statements propagate, the CPC does not contain any provision to condition a trial that resolves the merits (in the event of waiver) with the agreement of the opposing party. On the other hand, paragraph 5 of article 485 of the CPC provides that the withdrawal of the lawsuit may be filed up to the trial. This led to the understanding that, after this decision was issued, its ratification would be conditional on the agreement of the opposing party.
However, in the case of an application for mandamus, unlike in actions involving only private parties, the authority's agreement to the request for withdrawal is dispensable. This is because, while in private relations (fully governed by the CPC) the defendant also has an interest in judicial relief from the moment it joins the case, in disputes against the Public Administration, via the route of mandamus, there is nothing to be said of the State's interest in obtaining a decision that recognizes the legality of the contested act.
In fact, the acts performed by the Public Administration are considered, even if by presumption, in line with the legal system until another one (administrative act or judicial decision) comes about that says otherwise. Therefore, from the Public Administration's perspective, before or after the trial in a writ of mandamus, there is not even a procedural interest that requires ratification of the withdrawal with the agreement of the authority.
Due to the characteristic of self-execution of administrative acts, it is not necessary for the Judiciary to act with the objective of recognizing the existence of a right against the private party. The Administration is allowed to adopt measures for direct execution of its own act. As an example, tax foreclosures.
The matter was examined by the Federal Supreme Court (STF), under the general repercussion system, in the trial of Extraordinary Appeal 669.367-RJ, in which the Court decided that the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1973 (article 267, paragraph 4 - reproduced in article 485, paragraph 5, of CPC/2015) which required the agreement of the adverse party for ratification of the withdrawal after the trial was rendered is not applicable to writs of mandamus.
According to Justice Rosa Weber, who issued the prevailing opinion, even if the trial has granted the mandamus claimed, "by withdrawing from favorable judicial relief in a writ, the applicant is subject to the prevalence of the administrative act that, before, it sought to rule out, as though the writ had never been filed; the self-execution of the administrative act resurfaces in its entirety.”
Necessarily, with the withdrawal in a writ of mandamus manifested after the trial has been rendered - whether it was favorable for or against the private party - the effect is to restore the enforceability of the administrative act challenged in the proceedings. Even in situations where the trial is unfavorable to the private party, the withdrawal from the writ of mandamus will only entail preservation of the act of authority as issued, there being no grounds for objection by the Public Administration.
In the case of a writ of mandamus, it is not in the interest of the Public Administration to obtain a judicial enforcement instrument (res judicata) to protect itself from the taxpayer. The administrative act fought is already endowed with self-execution. With the withdrawal of the claim, its legality is confirmed.
The elements outlined contribute to conclude for the correctness of the position reached by the STF, followed by the Brazilian courts, and on the need to interpret the rules that establish the procedure in line with the particularities of the substantive law discussed in the specific lawsuit.
The withdrawal from the writ of mandamus, regardless of the stage of the proceeding, re-establishes the self-execution of the administrative act contested. Therefore, the requirement that the authority agree to the private party's claim is unnecessary, since the end sought by the Public Administration itself will already be achieved.
[1] Article 485. The judge shall not decide the merits when he: (...)VIII - ratifies withdrawal of the action;
[2] Article 487. There shall be a resolution on the merits when the judge: (...) III - ratifies: (...) c) the waiver of the claim made in the action or in the counterclaim.
- Category: Litigation
When the new Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) entered into force, one of the provisions that generated great stir in legal scholarship was article 139, IV, which gave the judges the power to “determine all inductive, coercive, mandatory, or subrogatory measures necessary to ensure compliance with a judicial order, including in actions that have as their purpose a monetary payment.” The futurology exercises on what claims would be submitted to the judges and to what extent these provisions could give rise to a wave of judicial activism were fruitful.
In fact, it is a provision that gives room for the creativity of the parties and judges, since its objective is to select and apply the measures that, in the specific case, have the greatest chance of compelling the debtor to comply with a certain judicial order or obligation. At first, a series of very original claims could be identified: suspension of social network accounts and blocking of instant messaging applications, blocking of credit cards, prohibition of access to condominium leisure areas by defaulters, sealing of commercial establishments, or part of commercial activity, among others.
This diversity of claims challenged the courts to develop some criteria for applying atypical measures to balance the creditor's enforcement claim and the rights - particularly fundamental rights - of the debtor. In addition, it was necessary to carry out an examination of the measures required that would be effective in motivating the fulfillment of the obligation and which would be emulative and motivated by vengefulness or merely punitive intent. These criteria have been outlined around the concepts of reasonableness, proportionality, and the use of atypical measures as the ultima ratio.
More than two thirds of decisions on atypical measures involve suspension or seizure of CNH and passport
The application of these criteria over the four years of the CPC has finally defined a certain typicity to the atypical measures most demanded and therefore most often granted. Thus, although the legal provision gives the judge broad powers to define the best atypical measure to be applied in the specific case, most of the claims for application of article 139, IV, of the CPC and, consequently, of the decisions that grant the application of the atypical enforcement measures, revolve around the suspension or seizure of the National Driver's License (CNH) and passports. At the São Paulo Court of Appeals (TJSP), for example, 362 out of 544 judgments on atypical measures issued between 2016 and 2019 dealt with claims of this nature - over 66%, therefore.[1]
In view of this, the delimitation of the criteria for granting and maintaining atypical enforcement measures, and the current stage of this discussion with the higher courts - as will be seen below - is already occurring in a much more controlled environment, with a much smaller variety of claims and decisions. The same was observed in the TJSP during the new coronavirus pandemic.
The case law of the STJ and the parameters for granting atypical measures
The case law of the Superior Court of Appeals (STJ) regarding atypical measures, following the trend observed with the TJSP (and other state courts), has also been forming around claims for suspension or apprehension of CNH and passports. Therefore, it is not uncommon for the parameters for granting or revoking atypical enforcement measures to be found in a habeas corpus suit, on the grounds that they constrain the fundamental rights of debtors to come and go.
The following is an analysis of some recent judgments by the STJ aimed at identifying which parameters have prevailed for the application of atypical measures.
- Resp 1.788.950/MT (decided on April 23, 2019)
Execution of an extrajudicial enforcement order brought by the appellant against Mr. Fernando Bardi. At the trial level, an interlocutory decision was issued rejecting the claim for suspension of the CNH and seizure of the passport of the judgment debtor. The appellant filed an interlocutory appeal, which was denied relief. Thereafter, the appellant filed a special appeal for annulment alleging, among other things, violation of article. 139, IV, of the CPC, since it would be "appropriate and necessary to adopt an atypical enforcement measure, as it is essential for satisfaction of the obligation in the execution proceeding, considering that numerous attempts have already been made to locate assets liable to constriction, all of them unsuccessful."
Appellate Decision. In the opinion, it was stated that application of article 139, IV, of the CPC requires:
- The prior summons of the judgment debtor to pay the debt or to present assets intended to settle it, followed, as a corollary, by the typical acts of expropriation;
- The prior exhaustion of the typical means of satisfaction of the debt executed;
- The existence of minimal indications that the judgment debtor possesses assets capable of satisfying the debt; and
- The decision to authorize the use of indirect enforcement measures must also be duly reasoned, according to the specific circumstances of the case (case-by-case analysis).
In the specific case, the STJ held that, despite having exhausted the traditional means of satisfaction of the debt, there were no signs that the debtor was hiding its assets, but rather that it did not possess assets to pay off the debt, which is why it dismissed the special appeal, as highlighted by the reporting judge Nancy Andrighi in her opinion:
"In short, it is possible for the judge to adopt atypical enforcement means provided that, if there is evidence that the debtor possesses assets capable of fulfilling the obligation imposed on it, such measures are adopted in a secondary manner, by means of a decision that contains adequate grounds for the specificities of the concrete scenario, with due regard for the substantantive adversarial process and the requirement of proportionality."
More recently, the same grounds were adopted in the following appeals: REsp 1.782.418/RJ (DJe April 26, 2019), 1.828.969/MT (DJe September 5, 2019); REsp 1.854.289/PB (DJe February 26, 2020), and REsp 1864190 (Dje June 19, 2020).
2. HC 558.313/SP (decided on June 23, 2020)
Collection action in view of execution of judgment. In this case, the partners of the judgment debtor company (whose corporate veil was pierced) filed a writ of habeas corpus in order to vacate the order restricting the departure of the patients from the national territory, without a prior guarantee of execution.
Appellate Decision. In the opinion, it was stated that application of article 139, IV, of the CPC requires:
- Meet the requirements of necessity, adequacy, and proportionality of the measure;
- There are indications that the debtor has expropriated assets or has been hiding its assets to frustrate the execution; and
- The typical execution measures are found to be ineffective.
In the specific case, it was found that (i) the international trips taken by the patients are not be compatible with the allegation of lack of funds to pay the amounts due, (ii) the typical measures proved ineffective, and, (iii) although the judgment debtors claimed that the atypical enforcement measure was disproportionate, they did not present any alternative, less burdensome, and more effective executive means, as incumbent on them, for which reason the habeas corpus was not heard and the constriction was maintained.
3. HC 453870/PR (decided on June 25, 2019)
Tax execution filed by the municipality of Foz do Iguaçu (PR). In this case, the debtor filed a habeas corpus suit to vacate the order that seized his passport and suspended his CNH.
Appellate Decision. At the time of the judgmnet, it was stated that, in tax collection proceedings, atypical personal coercive measures, such as suspension of passport and driver’s licence, are not fitting, as application thereof in this context would result in excess. To this end, the STJ held that the State has super priority in its capacity as creditor, and tax debt is highly resistent to the risk of default by its own “legal and procedural conformation”.
In view of this, the STJ granted habeas corpus for the exclusion of the atypical measures contained in the judgment under appeal, since they were excessive, stating that, in the record, there was already indication of attachment of 30% of the salary the defendant receives at Sanepar (the Paraná Sanitation Company).
Atypical enforcement measures during the pandemic
The new coronavirus pandemic has placed greater emphasis on the need for a careful and a thorough examination of the necessity, adequacy, and proportionality of the atypical enforcement measures requested. The decrease in income and the financial difficulties caused by the health crisis have increased both the creditors' need to receive and the debtors' solvency problems, making the judge's actions even more critical, as they are responsible for balancing the interests expressed by the parties in the case.
Because of the short time that has elapsed since the restrictive measures adopted by the public authorities to contain the advance of the pandemic began, few judgments on the application of atypical enforcement measures in the context of the pandemic have reached the courts.
In the scope of execution for a certain amount, the TJSP, despite finding that, in theory, the atypical measure claimed as a way to ensure the success of the enforcement claim, opted for the non-applicability of article 139, IV, of the CPC, in view of the exceptional situation caused by the pandemic. According to the judgment, this guidance would persist until, in principle, the return to economic normalcy:
"EXECUTION FOR CERTAIN AMOUNT. FINANCING AGREEMENT, GUARANTEED BY MORTGAGE. ATYPICAL COERCIVE MEASURES UNDER ARTICLE 139, IV, OF THE CPC. SUSPENSION OF CREDIT CARD. REASONABILITY. PROPORTIONALITY. 1. Atypical coercive measures may be used to compel the debtor to perform his duty (CPC, article 139, IV). 2. However, they should not be merely a means of constricting the debtor, as a mere punishment, without bringing about for the creditor the possibility of satisfaction of the debt. The measures must be useful to that satisfaction, as well as proportionate and reasonable. 3. The blocking of credit cards seems to us, as a rule, an appropriate measure that contributes to the achievement of the scope of the execution process, aiming at removing debtors from their inertia. 4. Considering, however, the situation of deep economic and financial crisis imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic, without prospects for improvement in the scenario of global recession in the short term, we have to maintain the decision under appeal, at least until the resumption of economic normality, when the issue may be reviewed. Appeal denied relief, with an observation.” (TJSP; Interlocutory Appeal 2092438-16.2020.8.26.0000; reporting judge: Melo Colombi; Adjudicatory Body: 14th Chamber of Private Law; Central Civil Courts - 4th Civil Court; Date of Judgment: June 17, 2020; date of registration: June 17, 2020)
Excerpt from the opinion of the reporting judge:
"The blocking of cards of [...] would work as a stimulus for the discharge of their debts, without so much recalcitrance, being useful, therefore, for the scope of the execution process. It so happens that the current scenario in which we find ourselves does not recommend the adoption of this measure. [...]
The moment, therefore, does not favor the blocking of funds and means of acquisition of basic survival inputs of people (individuals or companies) who were already experiencing financial difficulties even before the arrival of the epidemic in our country."
The discussion regarding the applicability of atypical measures during the new coronavirus pandemic was given greater prominence in the area of alimony suits. In this case, there was discussion of the possibility of imposing house arrest on the alimony debtor in this context (cf. CNJ Resolution No. 62) and adopting, first, other atypical enforcement measures (credit card blocking, CNH etc.) before civil imprisonment. The application of a prison sentence in the current health crisis scenario would potentially expose the debtor to a substantially higher risk of contamination, which is why other legal restrictions have been adopted to encourage the payment of the alimony debt.
On the other hand, and considering the indispensable adequacy link between the atypical measure applied and the incentive given to the debtor to pay the debt, it is certain that, at the present time, restrictions such as suspension or seizure of a passport will not have the same effectiveness as in other times, considering the current limitations on international travel.
Thus, with the pandemic, the complex task of the courts to strike a balance between legitimately inducing compliance with a court order or obligation litigated and overly restricting the rights of debtors has become even more arduous and with potentially more serious consequences for the parties.
Parameters consolidating
The application of atypical enforcement measures, under the terms of article 139, IV of the CPC, brings with it the challenge of pondering and weighing up the interests of creditors and debtors, going beyond the sphere of assets and entering into the sphere of fundamental rights. With the submission of the subject to the scrutiny of the STJ, a list of parameters has been formed that should guide judges and courts in the application of the concept.
Currently, in order to maintain the constriction of CNH and passport due to default or debt, it is necessary to observe the following issues:
- Exhaustion of the typical means of satisfying the obligation (atypical measures as ultima ratio);
- Indications that the debtor is voluntarily concealing assets capable of discharging the debt;
- The appropriateness and proportionality of the measure, analyzed in the specific case; and
- Balanced relationship between the litigant parties.
Thus, although case law has tried to establish predictability in the application of these measures, there is still a high degree of subjectivity bequeathed to judges and courts to assess the advisability and effectiveness of atypical constrictions requested by creditors in each specific case.
The pandemic, which has significantly altered the financial condition of some creditors and debtors as well as the national and international travel dynamics of all individuals, has also interfered with the parameters for the application of the most common atypical measures and their effectiveness in effecting satisfaction of debtors’ obligations.
[1] Empirical research conducted in March of 2019, with the collection and analysis of all judgments with the term "atypical measures" available for consultation on the website of the Court of Appeals of São Paulo and relating to cases judged since March of 2016.
- Category: Corporate
On November 13, the Board of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) decided CVM Administrative Proceeding SEI No. 19957.005563/2020-75, which arose from an appeal filed against the understanding of the Bureau of Corporate Relations (SEP), manifested in Report No. 083/2020, to the effect that the founding shareholders of Linx S.A. are prevented from voting on certain matters on the agenda of the extraordinary general meeting (EGM) of the company called to resolve on the merger of all its shares into STNE Participações S.A.
Per the SEP’s understanding, the impediment on voting results from the receipt of a private benefit by the founding shareholders, pursuant to article 115, paragraph 1,[1] of the Brazilian Corporations Law (Law No. 6404/76), since the latter, due to the merger of shares, would enter into non-competition and consulting agreements with the acquiring company (ancillary contracts), and would be remunerated for the obligations assumed.
The founding shareholders argued that the benefit derived from the ancillary contracts was not linked to Linx's status as a shareholder, nor was it even a direct result of the decision at the meeting, which is why the compensation received could not qualify as a private benefit for the purpose of disqualification from voting under the Brazilian Corporations Law (LSA).
SEP, on the other hand, argued that "it would not be appropriate to believe the case of a private benefit provided for in article 115, paragraph 1, of Law No. 6,404/76 as restricted to benefits received in the condition of shareholders, either because there is nothing in the law that restricts this interpretation, or because article 109 itself already provides that the shares of each class will confer equal rights to their holders." From this point of view, a meeting resolution that intended to confer special rights to certain shareholders, in this condition as shareholder, would not be admissible according to article 109.
Also for SEP, "in spite of the non-competition commitments and the fact that the proposal to hire the [founding shareholder] is not, in itself, the subject matter of a resolution at a meeting, such agreements are an essential condition for the transaction, they originate precisely from STNE's proposal to take over Linx], and there is, therefore, an undeniable direct and intrinsic relationship between the benefit that will be received and the transaction to be resolved on at an EGM. This is not a circumstantial and uncertain situation which may potentially generate an environment that benefits the shareholder in some way. On the contrary, these are contracts signed in the context of a restructuring and whose effects only require approval of the transaction at a meeting.”
Within the scope of the proceeding, the Board of the CVM, by majority of votes, granted the appeal[2] filed by the founding shareholders, to admit their vote at Linx's EGM, which resolve on the transaction based on the following grounds (presented in summary form):
- The ancillary contracts are not the subject of a resolution at the EGM, nor do they have Linx as a counterparty or intervening party, nor do they generate obligations or encumbrances for the company;
- The benefits do not derive from the status of partner of the founding shareholders and are not even related to the position of those shareholders in Linx's capital stock. In this sense, they do not constitute a breach of equality in the treatment of shareholders, a necessary condition to establish the legal scenario for an impediment to voting;
- The ancillary contracts are not "born" out of the decision of the Linx shareholders meeting regarding the matters on the agenda of the EGM in question, but out of the ability and expertise of the founding shareholders to compete with Linx after the transaction has been completed or to provide the services contracted, as the case may be;
- There is clearly a correlation between the meeting resolution and ancillary contracts, due to the connection for generating effects, but even so, it is not characterized as a direct benefit to which the shareholders will give cause through the meeting decision; and
- The interpretation that the concept of a private benefit would encompass indirect benefits, whether derived from contracts of any nature or from other sources (and not those received as shareholders), would create too great an intersection between the concepts of private benefit and conflicting interest.
In a dissenting vote, and corroborating the understanding expressed by SEP, board member Henrique Machado found an impediment to vote due to the private benefit or, alternatively, due to a conflict of interest, based on the following grounds:
- The principle of equal treatment of all shareholders continued to be protected by article 109, paragraph 1, of the LSA, and thus the appropriate interpretation of the scenario for a private benefit under article 115, paragraph 1, is that which presupposes equal treatment among shareholders and provides abstention from voting regardless of whether the advantage to be gained is linked to the condition of shareholder, provided that it is not extended to the other partners;
- Although the ancillary contracts are not resolved on by the EGM, the fact remains that they were negotiated together and are included in the conditions and characteristics of the transaction;
- In the field of governance, there is a typical situation of adverse selection prior to the formation of the contract (ex ante) that should give rise to the adoption of mechanisms to prevent the risk of expropriation and encourage the alignment of interests between management and minority shareholders, such as recusal from voting; and
- Even if one could rule out the possibility of a private benefit, the potential conflict between Linx's interests and those of its founding shareholders resulting from ancillary contracts, whose imperative expression "may not vote" in article 115, paragraph 1, of the LSA prevents the participation of the founding shareholders.
In his statement of vote, board member Alexandre Costa Rangel diverged from board members Marcelo Barbosa and Flávia Perlingeiro exclusively in relation to the recognition of the impediment to voting by shareholders in cases of conflict of interest, under the following terms: "I do not envisage legal support to prevent in advance the exercise of the right to vote of a shareholder in a conflict of interest, based on article 115, paragraph 1, in fine, of Law 6,404/76. In my opinion, the legal framework provided for by the Brazilian Corporations Law does not authorize formal prohibition a priori of the vote of a shareholder in the event of a conflict of interest, in accordance with the aforementioned provision."
As a result, the lawsuit reversed SEP's understanding, and the CVM's Board stated that, for the facts under analysis (those suggested in the SEP Report and others heard up to the judgment date), Linx's founding shareholders would not be prevented from voting at the EGM called to approve the transaction.
[1] Article 115. Shareholders must exercise the right to vote in the interest of the company; votes exercised in order to cause damage to the company or other shareholders, or to obtain, for oneself or for others, an advantage to which one is not entitled and which results, or may result, in prejudice to the company or to other shareholders are considered abusive.
Paragraph 1. Shareholders may not vote on resolutions of the general meeting on the valuation report of assets with which to contribute for the formation of the capital stock and approval of their accounts as officer, or on any others that may benefit them in a particular way, or in which they have an interest conflicting with that of the company.
[2] With votes in favor by Marcelo Barbosa, chairman, and the directors Flávia Perlingeiro and Alexandre Costa Rangel.
- Category: Restructuring and insolvency
Bill 4,458/20, approved by the Senate on November 25 of this year, amends laws - 11,101/05, 10,522/02, and 8,929/94, to update the legislation on judicial reorganizations, extrajudicial reorganizations, and bankruptcy of entrepreneurs and business companies. The bill stems from Bill 6,229/05, which was passed in the House of Representatives on August 26.
The signature of the President of Brazil is now expected to take place by December 24 of this year. If the current wording of the bill is maintained, the main points of change in the institutes of the current reorganization and bankruptcy legislation will be those indicated in the table below.
The main changes relate to:
- legal certainty and super priority in relation to the granting of loans during judicial reorganization;
- legal certainty and modification of some of the asset sale rules;
- cross-border bankruptcy and cooperation between domestic and foreign courts in such cases;
- fresh start;
- general rules for extrajudicial reorganization, with the possibility of including labor credits and reducing the quorum required for approval of the plan;
- installment payment of debts with the Federal Government and other tax matters; and
- judicial reorganization of rural producers.
In the event of doubt, Machado Meyer's debt Restructuring and Bankruptcy and Tax teams are at your disposal.
Partners of the Restructuring team responsible for this newsletter: Renata Oliveira and Renato Maggio.
Partner on the Tax team responsible for this newsletter: Bruna Marrara.
| Analysis of the main changes | |
| Law No. 11,101/05 before the approval of the Bill | Law No. 11,101/05 after the approval of the Bill |
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Stay period
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Stay period
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Prevention of the court
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Prevention of the court
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Arbitration agreement
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Arbitration agreement
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Distribution of profits or dividends
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Distribution of profits or dividends
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Verification and registration of credits
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Verification and registration of credits
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Assignment of credits
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Assignment of credits
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Conciliation and mediation
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Conciliation and mediation
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Role of the judicial trustee
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Role of the judicial trustee
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GMC
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GMC
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Abusive vote
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Abusive vote
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Judicial reorganization of a rural producer
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Judicial reorganization of a rural producer
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Means of judicial reorganization
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Means of judicial reorganization
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Prior finding
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Prior finding
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Alternative plan proposed by the creditors
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Alternative plan proposed by the creditors
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Labor credits
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Labor credits
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Sale of assets
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Sale of assets
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Partner or supporting creditor
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Partner or supporting creditor
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DIP financing
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DIP financing
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Procedural and substantive consolidation
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Procedural and substantive consolidation
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Possibility for the tax authorities to file for bankruptcy of the debtor
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Possibility for the tax authorities to file for bankruptcy of the debtor
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Closing of the judicial reorganization
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Closing of the judicial reorganization
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Fresh start
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Fresh start
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Extension of the effects of the bankruptcy
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Extension of the effects of the bankruptcy
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List of creditors in bankruptcy
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List of creditors in bankruptcy
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Rapid closure of bankruptcy in the event of absence of assets
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Rapid closure of bankruptcy in the event of absence of assets
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Sale of assets in bankruptcy
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Sale of assets in bankruptcy
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Extinguishment of the obligations of the debtor
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Extinguishment of the obligations of the debtor
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Extrajudicial reorganization
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Extrajudicial reorganization
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Transnational Bankruptcy
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Transnational Bankruptcy
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Application of the Code of Civil Procedure
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Application of the Code of Civil Procedure
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Matched transactions and derivatives
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Matched transactions and derivatives
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Tax issues
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Tax issues
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- Category: Tax
The Brazilian Federal Revenue Service (RFB) has expressed its position, through Solution of Consultation No. 206/03 and No. 232/07 and SRF Interpretative Declaratory Act No. 25/03, to the effect that it suffices to have the final and unappealable decision in an action recognize the right to restitution of amounts to call for the levying of IRPJ and CSLL for legal entities submitted to the accrual method.
Specifically in SRF Interpretative Declaratory Act No. 25/03, the RFB presents two scenarios for tax assessment purposes when the court decision does not define the amount to be refunded: the date of sending of the judicial payment order or, if a motion to stay execution is filed, the date of the final and unappealable judgment.
In this scenario, with the growing number of final and unappealable cases that recognize the right to repetition, many taxpayers have opted to go to court to litigate the time when the IRPJ and CSLL are levied, if whether:
- at the time of the final and unappealable decision that declared only the right to set off, the calculation/settlement of which will occur administratively;
- at the time of registration of the administrative claim; or
- in the transmission of setoff declarations (DCOMPs).
The federal circuit courts have been providing different solutions for the issue and have, in general, analyzed the issue according to the concepts of asset increase and economic and legal availability, and the (i) liquidity of the credit recognized by the final and unappealable decision, for the purposes of levying IRPJ and CSLL.
Recently, the Federal Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit[1] expressed its position in favor of the taxpayer's theory and set aside the levying of IRPJ and CSLL, inasmuch as the final decision had only assured the right to offset, without identifying the amount actually due. The court established that IRPJ and CSLL are due only when the tax authorities approve the offset.
Along the same lines, there is the recent decision by the Federal Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit,[2] which found that IRPJ and CSLL will be levied if, on the date of the final and unappealable judgment, the decision defines the amount to be returned. If only the right to offset is recognized, taxes are not required at the time of the final and unappealable judgment.
The Federal Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit,[3] in turn, has precedents to the contrary, since it concluded that "once the taxpayer's right to a setoff credit is recognized by a final and unappealable decision, the legal availability of the revenue (asset increase) will already be accrued, and the triggering event for the IRPJ and CSLL is established.
Along the same lines argued by taxpayers, the Superior Court of Appeals (STJ) reviewed an analogous claim and recognized that mere expectation of right and indebtedness resulting from the final and unappealable decision does not represent an asset increase to be taxed by IRPJ and CSLL, as established in article 43 of the National Tax Code.
Considering the divergent decisions rendered by the federal circuit courts regarding the interpretation of federal legislation, it will be incumbent on the STJ to give the final word on the matter, in order to provide legal certainty to taxpayers as to when they will offer the tax credits to the tax authorities.
[1]TRF 3rd Circuit, Ap 5004691-74.2019.4.03.6114, opinion drafted by Federal Appellate Judge Antonio Carlos Cedenho, decided on July 24, 2020; AI 5010177-15.2020.4.03.0000, opinion drafted by Federal Appellate Judge Marli Marques Ferreira, decided on July 20, 2020.
[2]Ap 08107154820194058400, Federal Appellate Judge Rogério de Meneses Fialho Moreira, 3rd PANEL, decided on July 2, 2020.
[3]TRF 2nd Circuit, 3rd Specialized Panel, Appeal 5004097-22.2019.4.02.5101, opinion drafted by Federal Appellate Judge THEOPHILO ANTONIO MIGUEL FILHO, decided on December 3, 2019; TRF 2nd Circuit, 3rd Specialized Panel, Appeal 5035622-22.2019.4.02.5101, opinion drafted by Federal Appellate Judge MARCUS ABRAHAM, decided on August 10, 2020.
- Category: Real estate
The Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure (Federal Law No. 13,105/15) lists in its articles 879 and 880 the events for forced sale of assets of the judgment debtor in the course of lawsuits. These are the award, sale by private initiative, and, further, the electronic or in-person judicial auction. In accordance with the procedural regulations in force, in cases where there is no interest on the part of the judgment creditor in the award of the asset, sale by private initiative is now admitted, in preference to an auction.
This instrument is a novelty introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure to speed up the resolution of disputes and rises judgment creditor’s autonomy, since it can convert the pledged asset into cash, seeking buyers to satisfy his claim. However, the procedures of the sale by private initiative still raises doubts (including practical), due to the existence of legislative gaps, especially in relation to real estate matters. This is due to the fact that the Code of Civil Procedure is silent on important issues for real estate transactions. For instance, the valuation of the property or the nature of the acquisition (original or derived), which may entail the assumption of an encumbrance by the acquirer, among other points highlighted below.
According to the legal rules, the judgment creditor may request award of the asset pledged in the ongoing lawsuit itself. This means that the creditor will replace the obligation to pay in cash with its own pledged asset, appropriating it as a way to satisfy the claim. However, if the judgment creditor has no interest in the award it may request the sale of the property to a third party, which may be done directly or through a real estate broker or an auctioneer accredited by the judicial body (which should not be confused with a purely judicial auction, dealt with starting from article 881 of the Code of Civil Procedure). If there is no interest in sale by private initiative, the sale shall be done through the model of an in-person or electronic auction. Thus, the traditional auction continues to be an option, but applicable secondarily if there is no interest on the part of the judgment creditor in the award of the asset or in a sale by private initiative.
Article 880 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes that the procedure for disposal by private initiative shall be governed by the judge of the case. This means that the procedure and the practical application of the sale of the asset may vary according to each judge, who shall order: (i) a term for disposal; (ii) the form to give publicity to the sale; (iii) the minimum price; (iv) the terms of payment (v) request for guarantees; and (iv) the brokerage commission, if applicable. The judge will also sign, together with the purchaser and the judgment debtor (if it is present), the letter of sale and the reinstatement of possession order, which will represent the transfer titles of the property, to be recorded with the relevant Real Estate Registry Office, together with the proof of payment of the Real Estate Transfer Tax (ITBI).
Although divestiture by private initiative has preference over judicial auction, the rules governing this process are limited to the provisions of article 880, while auctions, a traditional form of divestiture in lawsuits, has much more robust regulations. There is no clear provision regarding the possibility of secondary application of the provisions dealing with auctions (ee.g., whether the person prevented from participating in a judicial auction, listed in article 890 of the Code of Civil Procedure, cannot carry out the acquisition on their own initiative either) in divestitures on their own initiative, which gives rise to doubts, in addition to making the aforementioned sale almost entirely governed by the judge.
By way of illustration, some of the main shortcomings of private initiative disposal are highlighted:
- Need/requirement for the judge to make the divestiture offer public (e.g. via public notice) to confirm the existence of interested third parties;
- Express possibility for the judgment debtor, debtor or interested third party to request disposal, regardless judgment creditor's agreement; and
- Objective criteria for the judge to establish a minimum sale value (e.g. requirement for appraisal or use of the municipal value plan, in the case of urban real estate).
In general, despite of the existence of various scholarly currents, the Judiciary standing has been bold in this sense, i.e. waiving the public notice as a requirement to the sale (which, in fact, would make the process lengthy and bring it closer to a traditional auction). In addition, requests for disposal by the judgment debtor or third parties, provided that it is with the consent of the judgment creditor, have been allowed. Undoubtedly, the most controversial point, however, is the valuation of the asset attached, for which case law has not yet been settled.
In addition to the points highlighted, from a real estate perspective, one of the main issues concerns the nature of a sale by private initiative. This is because, although it is a judicial sale, it is requested (most of the time) by the plaintiff in the action, and the terms and conditions are settled for by the judge, who directs the entire sale procedure. Given that, one debates whether or not existing propter rem encumbrances and/or debts would be enforceable against the purchaser/bidder of the asset, even if the procedure takes place entirely in a judicial sphere.
In relation to this issue, on February 14 of this year, when the Superior Court of Appeals (STJ) ruled on Special Appeal 929.244-SP (which deals with the enforceability of Real Estate and Urban Territorial Tax (IPTU) debts against the purchaser), it held that such a disposal is comparable to a public auction, given that it is "a joint sale of the asset seized, under judicial supervision, although with simpler procedures.” Thus, according to this decision, the sale by private initiative means an original acquisition of a real estate (i.e. a new property, not related to any issue or debt related to the prior owner), which is why the acquirer receives the property free of encumbrances and debts.
Another point that deserves to be highlighted is the possibility of applying the sale by private initiative in labor actions. In these lawsuits, the Code of Civil Procedure is applied in a secondary manner, but Decree-law No. 5,452/43, the Consolidated Labor Laws (CLT), in article 888, also regulates the matter, only in a different manner. The article stipulates that private disposal is only possible if there are no bidders at the auction.
In this sense, the prevalence of the principle of the specialty of labor law over subsequent supplementary legislation is discussed. The Judiciary has taken the position to allow application of the Code of Civil Procedure, that is, private sale before the auction, focusing on procedural economy and speed in the process, although there is also a current (minority) position that argues for application of the CLT.
Overall, the sale by private initiative aims to give dynamism to legal proceedings, to make the sale of pledged assets more efficient and less bureaucratic. However, the coercive disposal of assets may soon come up against legislative loopholes and divergent views on the application of the suitable legislation. There is a risk of this procedure to be challenged in its validity and, consequently, give rise to undesirable legal uncertainty, especially for the purchaser of property sold under such conditions.