Publications
- Category: Digital Law
Mauricio Tamer and Jade Stefanie
New guidelines on data processing and sharing have been discussed by the European Commission, which has adopted a proposed regulation to create a sound data-driven economy capable of monitoring the process of digital transformation in the European Union.
The action positions the European Union at the forefront of regulatory initiatives aimed at controlling data flow and digital economy models. It should be emphasized that data flow is a valuable step in a process of digital transformation, and keeping it in balance is as important as the protection of personal data.
The Data Act is part of the discussion of a set of actions and policies of the data strategy to chart Europe's digital future. The strategic plan aims to include measures to digital education and policies in the media to democratize the digital space.
The Regulation aims to consolidate and strengthen the European digital economy by making the sharing and processing of industrial data more fair and safer, stimulating competition in the data market and opening up opportunities for innovation.
Proposals for the Data Act are:
- Measures that enable users of connected devices to access the data they generate – often collected exclusively by manufacturers – and share it directly with third parties;
- Measures to rebalance the bargaining power over data sharing between companies with very unequal weights, including the adoption of contract models that allow for more equal sharing;
- Means for public sector bodies to be able to use data collected by the private sector in cases of emergencies and exceptional circumstances; and
- New rules that enable users to establish safeguards against illicit data transfers and
- cloud data processing service providers.
Among the main issues is also the control of the flow of data for commercial operations, whether in relation to companies and consumers or between companies involved in negotiations.
The inclusion of safeguards and the ability of the data subject to have greater autonomy and control of information about himself/herself directly impact the evaluation of projects and business strategies. Data are important assets that feed flexible production systems and decision-making. Therefore, delimiting the scope of ownership of these assets is a decisive factor in business relationships.
- Category: Infrastructure and energy
I. Introduction and assumptions
This article is intended to describe the legal framework and business environment of water and sanitation in Brazil. It does not comprise, therefore, specific and defined business opportunities, but rather an overall picture of selected relevant aspects of water and sanitation sector under a strictly legal and regulatory standpoint.
Brazil has approximately 5,000 municipalities and, therefore, potentially more than 5,000 incumbent authorities for water and sanitation services to the population in general. These authorities are not allowed to circumvent the main features of the general guidelines and the national framework discussed hereto, but particularities within the boundaries of the areas under their jurisdiction may arise, and they cannot be captured for this article, which intends not to reflect the local norms and practices existing throughout the country.
For ease of reference, this article is divided into the following sections: (i) Introduction and assumptions; (ii) Regulatory guidelines; and (iii) New Regulatory Framework.
II. Regulatory guidelines
Water and sanitation services to the population in general are legally qualified as utilities (public services) in Brazil. It means that the rendering of such services is not open to competition under the free market, but rather an attribution of the government, which may delegate these services within certain boundaries set forth in the law. Brazilian law recognizes two types of governmental entities as the primary authorities over water and sanitation activities: municipalities and regions (such as metropolitan areas). They can deliver water and sanitation services for the users either directly or by means of operators, to whom the services may be delegated and consisting of state-owned companies (“SOC”) or privately held companies (“PHC”). When services are delegated, municipalities or regions reserve to themselves a role of Granting Authorities (“GA”), overseeing operators, but must engage governmental agencies of another federative entity (for example, a municipality may engage a state agency) to coordinate interests and resolve conflicts among operators, GA and users.
That is to say: water and sanitation utilities are highly regulated activities in Brazil. As it will be discussed in item III, below, this regulation has recently been positively impacted by the enactment of a new framework that establishes national standards fostering private participation in water and sanitation sector (“New Regulatory Framework”). Although New Regulatory Framework is not aimed at deregulating water and sanitation in Brazil, it improves the standards for GA, regulatory agencies and SOC to perform their roles in water and sanitation sector, bringing more transparency, rule of law and long-term policies that result in the enhancement of the business environment in the water and sanitation sector. For details on this enhancement, please refer to section III below.
- (a) Models of regulation
Brazilian governmental agencies implement regulation on water and sanitation utilities under two different models: the discretionary regulation, usually applicable to agreements executed by SOC, and the contractual regulation, which must be carried out in compliance with the formal agreements entered with PHC, as predefined in the bid notice. This difference originates predominantly from the proceeding adopted for delegation of services for each type of operator.
- (b) Programme Contracts
As a general rule, service agreements entered with SOC do not come from a competitive procurement procedure, but rather from a former statutory authorization, now removed by the New Regulatory Framework, whereby SOC, based only on their state-owned status, could negotiate directly with GA the tariffs, tenor extensions from time to time and other terms and conditions for rendering services to the users. Such service agreements entered by and between SOC and GA (and not preceded by a public bidding) are called “Programme Contracts”.
- (c) Concessions
In turn, service agreements granted for PHC are necessarily preceded by a competitive bidding procedure, initiated with the publication of a bid notice by a certain GA, containing a binding draft of the services agreement that will be entered into with the winning bidder. The criteria for choosing the winning bidder may vary from the lowest tariff/payments value up to the highest concession fee (signing bonus) offered by the bidders, under the conditions set forth by the bid notice and the attached services agreement. Service agreements derived from such competitive procurement procedure may have different legal regimes, such as common concessions and public-private partnerships (“PPP”). Most of such agreements are common concessions and will be referred hereto as “Concessions” or “Concession Agreements”, as opposed to the Programme Contracts.
In other words, while discretionary regulation applies to Programme Agreements, contractual regulation governs Concessions.
- (d) Tariff review under Programme Contracts
Overall, because they rely on a discretionary regulation, Programme Contracts executed between municipalities (or regions) and SOC do not provide for investments, key performance indicators (“KPI”) and/or goals for universalizing the access to water and sanitation services applicable to the whole timeframe of the agreement. Indeed, the terms of the obligations incumbent on SOC are determined from time to time by the governmental agency in charge of regulating the services delivered in a certain local or region. For such purpose, agencies periodically calculate tariff values valid for the next operation cycle (with a horizon of up to five years) by implementing specific methodologies for projecting values of WACC, CAPEX and OPEX applicable to that operation cycle. Few governmental agencies have detailed methodologies set forth in advance for water and sanitation services.
- (e) Tariff review, KPIs, universalization goals and investments under Concessions
On the other hand, Concessions go at the opposite direction: tariffs, obligations (including KPIs and universalization goals) and risk allocation between PHC and GA are predefined in the bid documents, resulting in the initial economic and financial balance of the agreement and, therefore, supporting the offer submitted by the winning bidder. By statutory definition, whenever such initial economic financial balance is affected (and to the extent that such risk has not been allocated to the PHC), the PHC has the right to rebalance the agreement aiming at the maintaining of that initial balance.
In addition, modifications agreed upon between PHC and GA during the Concession (as additional investments to include new neighborhoods as supervening obligations of PHC) may result in amendments that must also assure to PHC appropriate compensation to preserve the initial economic and financial balance of the agreement. Rules for rebalancing the Concession are laid down in detail by the agreement. Governmental agencies coordinate the procedure to rebalance Concessions and have the final word in the administrative level on the amounts and mechanisms for compensating PHC, in accordance with the terms and conditions established by the agreements. When the rebalancing claim is accepted by a governmental agency, the agreement is amended to reflect the compensation mechanism that settle the dispute, which is in most of the cases either a tenor extension of the Concession or an increase in the tariff value.
Economic and financial rebalances are also set forth in Programme Agreements. What makes the rebalancing procedure different for SOC and PHC is the fact that Concessions are not governed by a regulatory WACC. While the cost of capital under the discretionary regulation is arbitrated periodically for SOC, such cost is a market variable for PHC, which undertake interest rates as a risk usually fully allocated to private party under Concessions. Notwithstanding such risk allocation under Concessions, the financial data necessary to carry out rebalance procedures are predefined as a fix value in the bidding procedures.
Alongside the economic and financial rebalance of the Concession, the agreement provides for inflation protection mechanisms structured as an annual price readjustment. Either national indexes of prices, such as IPCA or IGPM, or methods specifically defined by the agreement, with parametric components that reflect price changes from time to time (“fómula paramétrica”), underlie such mechanisms.
- (f) Efficiency gains
One difference between discretionary and contractual regulation that warrants attention relates to the appropriation of efficiency gains by SOC and PHC. From one side, under Programme Contracts, tariff review procedures applicable to SOC arbitrate OPEX to calculate the tariff valid for the next cycle as being the OPEX value effectively incurred by SOC in the last cycle. This approach has the practical effect of reducing tariff value for the new cycle, in relation to OPEX, in the total amount of operational efficiency gains that SOC may have achieved during the previous cycle. In other words, SOC are not allowed to appropriate efficiency gains from reducing OPEX from time to time.
On the other side, Concessions go to the opposite direction. Differently from Programme Contracts, Concessions, as a rule, allow PHC not to share with users nor GA the reduction of estimated expenses. Specifically with regards to OPEX value, PHC are expected to have uncapped returns, since tariff review procedures applicable to Concessions do not capture potential efficiency gains that PHC might have achieved.
The difference on the approach to the efficiency gains under tariff review procedures between Programme Agreements and Concessions leads to potential opposite incentives to SOC and PHC to run their OPEX. Since for SOC efficiency will be fully captured for the reduction of the tariff (modicidade tarifária) and become the ceiling for the OPEX in the next operational cycle, such companies are expected to have in comparative terms less incentives as PHC have to carry on OPEX in the most efficient manner.
- (g) Intermediary Conclusion
All things considered, one may conclude under Brazilian law and regulatory practices that contractual regulation has relevant upsides when comparing it with the discretionary regulation:
- under the discretionary regime, tariff review tends to be much less predictable. While the New Regulatory Framework may enhance the current scenario, since it assigned to Water National Agency (“ANA”) responsibilities on professionalizing and unifying water and sanitation regulation in Brazil, the actual enactment of such uniform rules applicable nationwide will still take time. On the other hand, contractual regulation does not offer so much leeway to agencies for tariff review purposes, considering that such rules are expressed in the agreements, thus bringing more stability for decision making in investing in the water and sanitation sector;
- as anticipated, discretionary regulation offers less incentives for efficiency gains, which is the essence for the private participation in the sector. Concessions, in turn, usually allow the appropriation of efficiency gains by PHC. This circumstance fosters attraction to projects modelled under contractual regulation guidelines;
- contractual regulation is more consistent with the legal regime of public procurement procedures in Brazil, whereby bidders must be granted with accurate and complete information to enable them to make their best offers.
For the ease of reference, please refer to the table below:
| Affected Companies | Tariff Review Procedure | Efficiency gains | |
|
SOC | Investment goals, OPEX value and WACC are periodically arbitrated by agency | Appropriation applies only during an operational period of time. Efficiency will afterwards reduce tariff values (“modicidade tarifária”) |
|
PHC | Rules are set forth in advance under the bidding documentation | Efficiency gains retained (Uncapped returns) |
III. New Regulatory Framework
In July, 2020, the Federal Government enacted Law 14026, which modified Law 11445 of 2007 (known as Statute of National Policy on Basic Sanitation, comprising water and sanitation) among other statutory provisions by stablishing a new legal and regulatory framework on water and sanitation services. New Regulatory Framework results from the necessity of attracting private capital to accelerate the universalization access to water and sanitation services in Brazil.
Nowadays, 100 million people in Brazil (almost 40% of the total population) do not have sewage services and 30 million are deprived from drinking water in their homes. The policy makers behind New Regulatory Framework decided to overcome this scenario until 2033 (with some exceptions up until 2040) when it is expected that Brazilians become duly served with drinking water (99% of the population) and with collection and treatment of sewage (90% of the population). This timeframe brings financial constraints to SOC, which is why PHC are welcome to expand their participation in the sector. In this sense, New Regulatory Framework is essentially a private participation program. Its main features are listed below.
- (a) Compliance of SOC with universalization goals
Under New Regulatory Framework, all the agreements in force on the date of the enactment of the new law must be amended up until March 31st, 2022, to set forth explicit universalization goals. Most of Programme Contracts, because of their incompleteness typical of the discretionary regulation, were silent with respect to such goals. For embracing such goals on serious and viable terms, SOC have two basic alternatives to comply with New Regulatory Framework: either by their own financial means or privatization.
- (a.1) Evidence of funding capacity[1]
For complying with New Regulatory Framework by their own financial means, SOC must evidence their funding capacity to meet the universalization goals through appropriating equity or debt funding. Decree regulating New Regulatory Framework determined December 31st, 2021 as a deadline for SOC to demonstrate before the governmental agency in charge of regulation of each Programme Agreement economic and financial means for enabling them to perform the obligations set forth in the new law. Governmental agencies have, on their turn, up until March 31st 2022 to review that information and make a decision. The agencies shall review the financial statements of SOC, feasibility studies and a funding plan. Under the funding plan, SOC must appoint relevant banks providing financing and present the respective engagement letters (not necessarily binding though), evidencing the SOC ability to raise sufficient funds up until December 31st, 2026.
Only the agreements deemed as being feasible under New Regulatory Framework and Decree requirements may be amended for providing the universalization goals in compliance with the new law. The agreements declared not feasible may be early terminated by decision of the respective GA or even judicially.
- (a.2) Incentives for privatization
The other alternative for SOC to comply with New Regulatory Framework goals is privatization[2].
New Regulatory Framework fosters privatization in two ways:
- According to the New Regulatory Framework, privatization will no longer result in the early termination of the Programme Agreements held by the SOC being privatized, subject to certain conditions. Before the enactment of New Regulatory Framework, the change of control of a SOC would implicate the automatic forfeiture of Programme Contracts, rendering privatization of SOC unfeasible under the old legislation;
- New Regulatory Framework allowed the extension of Programme Agreements if done as a step towards privatization, by converting them into Concessions. In these situations, consent of relevant GA is still mandatory, because of the extension of the agreement.
New Regulatory Framework does not exclude other private participation arrangements already regulated by previous regulation, such as PPP or even common concessions when combined with the redefinition of SOC role. For example, GA may commission SOC to commercialize treated water to PHC granted with a Concession Agreement, in such a way that SOC becomes solely an upstream operator while PHC is granted with all the other services, including all the relationship with end users.
- (b) Prohibition of new Programme Contracts
Aiming at the competitiveness and equal treatment among SOC and PHC, New Regulatory Framework prohibits the execution of new Programme Contracts and even the extension of Programme Contracts (other than as a step towards privatization). SOC may participate in auctions and other bidding procedures on the same terms as any other interested company, with no privileges or distinctions.
- (c) ANA: new assignments
Brazil has 27 states and over 5,000 municipalities. As above mentioned, municipalities alongside with regions, which are created by the states, are the incumbent authorities for water and sanitation services under Brazilian law, thus retaining the powers to delegate and regulate services.
Such federative organization on water and sanitation sector led Brazil to have dozens of governmental agencies in charge of regulating either Programme Contracts or Concessions. There are no uniformity and consistency among regulations enacted by each of those governmental agencies. In spite of the fact that each agreement has only one governmental agency in charge for its respective regulation, this multitude of authorities dealing with rules increases transactional costs and hampers the doing business.
Considering this scenario, New Regulatory Framework assigned to ANA roles for consolidating and harmonizing regulation and best practices in the sector by means of the enactment of national reference standards. Such standards do not directly bind the municipal and state regulatory agencies, but these subnational agencies have a strong incentive to adhere to them: when local and regional regulation is not conformed to the national standards, the respective operators and projects are prevented from receiving federal financial aids or even facility loans granted by banks controlled by the federal government, such as BNDES and CEF.
On water and sanitation, ANA has enacted only one national standard up until now, which regulates the applicable amendments to Programme Contracts and Concessions for conforming them to New Regulatory Framework.
- (d) Regionalization
Regionalization, under the New Legal Framework, consists of joining a number of different municipalities to act as a single block in delegating the services to a concessionaire in charge of providing water and sanitation services to the whole region. Such public policy aims at:
- Sustaining water and sanitation services in municipalities with low populational density, in which water and sanitation services might not be economically viable by themselves, by combining their operational revenues with larger, more profitable municipalities;
- Increasing state influence and attributions in the water and sanitation sector, since states tend to be more sophisticated and technically prepared to regulate these services;
- Fostering private participation in the sector, since operators benefit from larger scale in the context of regionalization of water and sanitation services (as opposed to providing services to a single municipality).
The main tools set forth by the New Regulatory Framework that contribute to the regionalization of water and sanitation services are:
- Creation, by the states, of metropolitan areas, urban agglomerations and micro regions, embracing a cluster of municipalities which must share with the state the granting authority on water and sanitation services to the relevant region, to the extent that the municipalities also need to share among themselves or with the state the infrastructure related to these public utilities. Under these regionalized structures and conditions, municipalities are automatically burdened with the obligation to share among themselves and the state where they are located the grating authority on water and sanitation services;
- Besides creating metropolitan areas, urban agglomerations and micro regions, states may create regional unities for water and sanitation services. The adhesion of the municipalities to the regional units is not mandatory;
- In the event that a particular state does not create the referred regions, federal government is entitled to set interfederative clusters for implementing the regionalization of these services (reference blocks) and adhesion of the municipalities to the reference blocks is not mandatory;
- Municipalities may implement another alternatives for regionalizing water and sanitation services, such as by means of public consortia or mutual interest agreements entered into with other municipalities and/or the state where they are located;
In the absence of metropolitan region, urban agglomeration or micro region, with the characteristics summarized in number 1, above, municipalities are incentivized to adhere to/implement a non mandatory regionalized structure, since they are not automatically burdened with the obligation to share the grating authority on water and sanitation services under regional units, reference blocks, public consortia or mutual interest agreement (as opposed to metropolitan areas, urban agglomerations and micro regions, which are mandatory). The main incentive municipalities have by doing so is the access to federal funding for water and sanitation services. Municipalities non-compliant with regionalization requirements are prevented to benefit from federal financial resources otherwise available to water and sanitation.
As a general rule, after Federal Decree 11030/2023, most of municipalities that do not participate of a metropolitan area, urban agglomeration, micro regions, regional units, reference blocks, public consortia or mutual interest agreement have until March 31st, 2023, to adhere to/implement a regionalized structure for providing water and sanitation services. From this date, municipalities that are not regionalized will be prevented to access financial resources provided by Federal Government as explained above.
Prior to the enactment of New Regulatory Framework, the determination of the incumbent authority on water and sanitation services among the federative entities could be debatable. Interpreting our Federal Constitution, most scholars and court precedents deemed municipalities as the natural authorities (treating water and sanitation as local services), but there were doubts with regards to municipalities located in metropolitan areas. Brazilian Supreme Court (“STF”) had three relevant precedents prior to the New Regulatory Framework. Under these precedents, the creation of metropolitan areas, which is a decision reserved to the states only, results in the necessary sharing of powers among the municipalities comprised in the region and additionally with the respective state.
As presented above, New Regulatory Framework consolidated such case law and deepened the general understanding on the matter. According to New Regulatory Framework, all the regions created by states lead to such mandatory sharing[3].. Accordingly, regions became authentic GA of water and sanitation services carried out in their territory. Moreover, considering the governance among the state and the municipalities comprised in the region, as far as region structures are adopted, state government tends to fulfill a predominant role among all the federative entities involved in the coordination and delegation of water and sanitation services.
That leadership of the state government is an upside for private participation in the sector. From a base case standpoint, it is easier for PHC to deal with only one government responsible for a whole region comprising dozens of municipalities. Additionally, as above mentioned, states tend to be a more sophisticated interlocutor for water and sanitation projects when comparing their administrative structure with those of municipalities.
- (e) Final Conclusion
Brazil faces an undeniable improvement in its business environment in the water and sanitation sector. The experience on contractual regulation as an alternative more friendly to private investment has been solidified for the last two decades. On the top of that, bidding procedures follow increasingly best practices for auctions and competitiveness, in terms of transparency, anti-corruption rules and equal treatment among national and foreign players. BNDES, since 2016, has been structuring bidding procedures for an increasing number of water and sanitation projects: aside from engaging highly skilled consultants for modelling bid notices and agreements, the bank capitalizes on its structure and reputation to materialize larger and challenging projects, as it was the recent case in Alagoas and Rio de Janeiro.
In parallel, New Regulatory Framework brings relevant keystones for doing water and sanitation business, promoting opportunities without threatening legal stability. Judicialization of certain projects and agreements may take place, although it is worth mentioning that STF, in a recent precedent which discussed the constitutionality of New Regulatory Framework, recognized that the new law is entirely conformed with the Brazilian legal system.
Considering the short-term needs for universalizing the access to water and sanitation services in favor of millions of Brazilians, it is expected a dynamic and legally robust pipeline of projects in the next few years.
[1] To be updated in attention to the recent enactment of a new decree.
[2] This provision does not prevent that specific laws at the state level must be enacted for authorizing the divestiture of the stockholding control. Since state governments are the controlling shareholders of SOC, New Regulatory Framework, as a federal legislation, could not have the effect of authorizing such a transaction on the benefit of another federative entity.
[3] There are few exceptions in which municipalities may withdraw from sharing water and sanitation utilities assigment in regions. For example, when one municipality does not share any infrastructure of water and sanitation with another entity, the former may preserve its exclusive powers on the matter.
- Category: Banking, insurance and finance
Changes in the Brazilian regulatory landscape have intensified in recent years mainly due to the process of social transformation that puts pressure on productive sectors, regulatory agencies and government institutions. After the Legal Framework of Startups and Innovative Entrepreneurship and the General Law for the Protection of Personal Data (LGPD), the wave of changes reaches the world of securitization through Provisional Measure (MP) 1.103/22, which creates the legal framework of securitization. Among other points, MP exponentially amplifies the chances of securitization of securities backed by credit rights.
The framework also fulfills the function of unifying the rules on securitization, until then laid down, mainly, in Law 9.514/97 – which regulates Certificates of Real Estate Receivables (CRI) and was later edited by Law 10.931/04 – and Law 11.076/04 – which regulates Agribusiness Receivables Certificates (CRA). These and other sparse norms left gaps on the subject. CVM Instruction 480/09, for example, does not present a specific treatment for securitizers, treating them only as other issuers of securities.
The discussion on a regulatory framework for securitizations was opened by the Public Hearing SDM 05/20, proposed by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM), and implemented by the MP, which sought to define its own needs and obligations, aligned with the reality of the entities.
MP is insightful and welcome especially when bringing a clear definition about securitization operations. According to article 17, "securitization transactions are considered to be the issuance and placement of securities with investors, the payment of which is primarily conditional on the receipt of funds from the credit rights that support it".
We understand, therefore, that securitizations may use any credit rights as a ballast of receivables certificates (CR), which "are titles of nominar credits, issued in a book-entry form, issued exclusively by securitizations, free trading, and constitute a promise of payment in cash, preserved the possibility of payment, and extrajudicial executive title", according to art. 19 of the MP.
Until then, this prerogative was limited only to the credit rights arising from CRIs and CRAs. The update therefore expands the securitization market to all sectors.
The standard also raises discussions about the possibility of emissions with restricted efforts from securities other than CRIs and CRAs. Under CVM Instruction 476/09, only these two certificates of receivables can be the subject of public offering with restricted distribution efforts. Considering the new rules on CRs edited by the MP, however, it is possible to understand that securitizers can use debentures or commercial notes to enable these transactions.
Another unfolding of the standard refers to the fiduciary regime and separate assets.
In accordance with Article 24 of the MP, securitizations may institute the fiduciary regime for the purposes of payment of RCs or other securities representing securitization operations, which will allow the individualization of liabilities and assets of an operation. This will give more security to the business and enable the execution of simultaneous operations without risk dependence between them. This concept can be applied, for example, to the issuance of debentures based on financial credits, provided for by Resolution 2,686 of the National Monetary Council.
The standard also expressly establishes the possibility of aggregating new credit rights as a ballast of securitization operations, as provided for in the issuing instrument (Articles 21, X, and 26, §2). The measure can be used by different sectors of the economy, especially with regard to mitigating the risk of asset failure.
In addition, MP provides for the issuance of Letters of Insurance Risks (LRS) and the flexibilization of the requirement of exclusive provision, by financial institution, of the bookkeeping and custody of securities.
LRS is securities linked to a portfolio of insurance and reinsurance policies. With mp, the issuance of LRS will be made through Specific Purpose Insurance Companies (SSPE), whose sole purpose is to carry out operations of acceptance of insurance risks, supplementary pension, supplementary health, reinsurance or retrocession. The flexibility of the exclusive provision requirement, in turn, aims to encourage the development of new technologies and innovations in the Brazilian capital market, by allowing cvm to modulate the requirement and, eventually, to withdraw it in certain markets.
The changes of the Regulatory Framework of Securitization come at a time conducive to the emergence of new types of operations and products. We will continue to watch out for further developments.
- Category: Infrastructure and energy
Coming into force on March 2, 2022, the National Mining Agency (ANM) Resolution 90/21 regulates Articles 43 and 44 of the Mining Code Regulation (Regulamento do Código de Mineração), providing the cases in which mining concessions (concessões minerárias) and mine manifests (manifestos de mina) can be offered as collateral for transactions aiming at financing mineral enterprises.
The new resolution is a result of contributions made by industry specialists, companies and other stakeholders under the public consultation (consulta pública) held on the second semester of 2020, and provides the requirements and conditions for the transfer of such mining rights in case of foreclosure.
The issue has long been the subject of debate. The possibility of granting mineral rights as collateral for financial transaction is a long-lasting request by players of the industry. Until the publication of the new resolution, the granting of mining assets as collaterals was regulated by Opinion JT-05 (Parecer JT-05), binding to the federal administration in light of its presidential approval.
In summary, such Opinion addressed exclusively the constitution of pledge over mineral rights and concluded that the encumbrance would be applied only to mining concessions (concessões de lavra). Furthermore, it provided that a prior approval by the National Defense Council (Conselho de Defesa Nacional) would be required for the registration of the encumbrances before ANM in relation to mining concessions located on border areas (área de faixa de fronteira). Given the precarious nature of the binding Opinion - the only instrument that regulated the subject -, the absence of sectoral regulation resulted in legal uncertainty for financiers, companies and the ANM itself.
The matter was originally given prominence with the attempt to reform the Mining Code (Código Minerário) by the government of former President Michel Temer in 2017, by means of the Provisional Measure (Medida Provisória) 790/17, which expired after it ran its 120 days course without approval by the National Congress. The subject was later included in the reform of the Mining Code Regulation (Regulamento do Código de Mineração), concluded in 2018 with the enactment of Decree 9.406/18, which provided the possibility of granting mining concession as collateral for financing purposes, but stipulated that the regulation of its requirements and conditions would be provided by ANM resolutions.
Main innovations
ANM Resolution 90/21 (Resolução ANM 90/21) introduced important advances and clarifications, such as:
- The possibility of burdening mine manifests as a mining collateral, provided that it is constituted by means of a public instrument;
- The definition of the finance transactions that can be secured by mineral rights as fundraising transactions, under any legal modality, for the financing of mining enterprises, their installation, expansion or regularization, including finance within the national financial system, as well as other structured project financing transactions;
- The definition that the collateralization of mineral rights is materialized by means of the registration before ANM of the respective public or private instruments, as applicable, by and between the mineral right’s titleholder (concessionária) and the financier. These contractual instruments shall be deemed confidential and should not have their access released to the public in the Electronic Information System (SEI – Sistema Eletrônico de Informações). Any third party, however, may request a certificate of the encumbrance, which must inform the value of the credit, its term, interest rate, the purpose of the transaction, the names of the financing institution, the debtor and the holder of the collateral, the date of registration and its write-off;
- the obligation for ANM to maintain a public consultation platform by means of which interested parties may consult the existence of mining collaterals;
- Clarification that, during the period of validity of the collateral over mineral rights:
- titleholders of mineral rights may not waive the mining title or surrender it in whole or in part without the express consent of the creditor;
- titleholders of the mineral rights shall remain responsible for the fulfilment of the obligations inherent to the mineral right and for the exercise of all acts necessary for their regularity and maintenance, including the possibility of expiry of the mining right;
- the impossibility of practice of any act or measure, whether or not provided for in the security agreement, which may compromise or hinder the operationalization and continuity of the mining right. The financial institution may, nevertheless, perform acts in an exceptional basis in order to avoid the perishing of the mineral right granted as collateral, including during the period between the judicial or amicable foreclosure of the mining collateral and the registration, before the ANM, of the transfer of such mining right to the new titleholder.
- The effective transfer of the mineral right foreclosed may only be perfected with the prior consent by the ANM. The transferee pursuant to a foreclosing auction shall be an entity legally able to hold mineral rights, satisfying the criteria provided by the Brazilian Federal Constitution and the Mining Code.
The new regulation provides, in addition to the above, that the request to collateralize a mineral right must inform the amount of the debt secured, its payment term, interest rate, the information of the collateralized mineral right and the purpose of the financing transaction, observing the requirements for the effectiveness of pledges provided for in Article 1,424 of Law 10.406/02 (the Brazilian Civil Code).
The ANM Resolution 90/21 provided that the secured financier has the right to access, upon prior request to ANM, the information of the collateralized mineral right submitted to ANM by the titleholder regarding:
- its safety and integrity;
- its collection of taxes and royalties;
- the results of its mineral exploration; and
- its exploitation and mineral production information.
By preventing the practice of any act or measure that compromise or hinder the operationalization and continuity of the activities for the use of mineral resources authorized by the granting power in the mining title, the new ANM Resolution 90/21 embraces similar rules applicable to the oil and gas industry, provided by ANP Resolution 785/19, which prohibits the influence of the financier on the management or execution of the assets object of a public concession.
Although ANM Resolution 90/21 has set out that the resources must be allocated to mining ventures, there is no restriction for the resources obtained from finances to be reverted to the collateralized mineral right itself, bringing legal certainty and paving the way for new capital flows to be directed to the mineral industry overall.
Market expectations
ANM Resolution 90/21 did not address the possibility of constituting fiduciary collaterals over mineral rights. Although collaterals of this nature are part of the set of security for project finance transactions, the constitution of collaterals of such nature over mineral rights continues to be a controversy between experts and players in the sector.
ANM Resolution 90/21 also refrained from addressing the possibility of constituting collaterals on mineral exploration permits. The measure would be especially relevant for the promotion of smaller companies involved in greenfield projects (the so-called "junior companies") and who typically face greater restrictions to access traditional forms of credit.
- Category: Infrastructure and energy
Por Rafael Vanzella, Debora Leal, Gabriel Rapoport Furtado and Gabriel Nagle
Law No. 14.286/21 (New Foreign Exchange Law), enacted on December 30, 2021, represents a milestone in Brazilian law regarding foreign currency transactions, including project financing on infrastructure sectors in Brazil. The new regulation is part of the “BC agenda”, promoted by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB), which aims to rearrange Brazilian foreign exchange legislation in order to improve a formerly diffuse and anachronic legal framework and consolidate it in light of modern economic and commercial practices.
Therefore, such legal milestone plays the crucial role of consolidating a refined regulatory environment, based on contemporary international standards. It will come into force on December 30, 2022, after one year of its official enactment. In parallel, BCB and the National Monetary Council (CMN) will be responsible for the subsequent regulation of several topics aroused by the New Foreign Exchange Law.
Among the innovations carried out by the new law, it should be mentioned the facilitation of the circulation of the Brazilian Real abroad. Accordingly, Section 6 of the Law provides that banks authorized to operate in foreign exchange markets may "comply with payment orders in Brazilian Reais received from abroad or sent abroad", pursuant to future BCB regulations. Thus, the possibility of investing funds raised in Brazil in foreign operations is enabled, through the use of current accounts, denominated in Brazilian Reais, kept in banks by institutions domiciled or based abroad, subject to the regulation and financial supervision of the respective country of origin. As a possible effect, there is an increase in the circulation of Brazilian Reais in international markets, while mitigating the existing limitations for the application, abroad, of funds raised in Brazil.
From the perspective of infrastructure projects, there are also relevant changes, systematized under the guidelines of Section 13, which addresses the payment in foreign currency of obligations enforceable in the Brazilian territory. Initially, it is important to note that Law No. 14.286/21 entails, among other effects, the repeal of Decree-Law No. 857/69, which, although derived from a different macroeconomic reality, is still in force during the vacatio legis of the new regulation. The elements introduced by Section 13 of the New Foreign Exchange Law expand certain provisions formerly contained in said decree-law, providing for a broader range of possibilities and consolidating a new business environment, whose practical contours have been established through the interaction of market agents and financial institutions.
Hence, item VII of Section 13 introduces the possibility of payment in foreign currency of obligations enforceable in Brazil, in connection to "contracts concluded by exporters in which the counterpart is a concessionaire, permit holder, authorized entity or lessee in the infrastructure sectors". Accordingly, the amendment allows legal business between exporters and infrastructure project holders to be indexed directly in foreign currency, within the framework of contracts concluded in areas such as energy, logistics and transport in general, basic sanitation and facilities, government agencies, among others.
Current analyses of this subject have not given account of the extent of this novel legal instrument. There is a greater enthusiasm in the energy sector, given the possibility, now expressly permitted by law, that contracts for the purchase and sale of energy (Power Purchase Agreements – PPAs) are indexed in foreign currencies such as the US dollar and the euro. In the case of electricity generators, financed in foreign currency, as an imported equipment, their debt service is mostly tied to the dollar. Thus, the celebration of dollarized PPAs will allow an immediate upside, so that revenues can be backed by an equivalent indexer.
However, the wording of this new law provides for an even more comprehensive array of opportunities because several areas of infrastructure, besides the energy sector, could also benefit from the new perspectives. Transport contracts and other businesses related to cargo handling, for example, may also be concluded in foreign currency. Considering general market practices, which make large use of take or pay provisions in contractual arrangements within such sectors, the possibility of revenues denominated in foreign currency will facilitate the creation of guarantees for financing taken through the same indexer. In basic sanitation, likewise, it is expected that associated projects, aimed at meeting the needs of large consumers, usually the exporters themselves, will originate contracts denominated in foreign currency. This will allow water and sewage system operators to diversify their debt portfolio to include indexed financing, or even more complex swap operations, which will mitigate foreign exchange risks in the import of effluent treatment equipment and technologies.
The importance of the measure introduced by the New Foreign Exchange Law is, consequently, remarkable, since contracts under the new rules are directly related to investments in infrastructure and accurately capture the link between the infrastructure sector and the international trade, either by the provision of transportation services, the import of pivotal equipment, or by the operation of essential public services such as water and energy supply. In the impossibility of concluding contracts with the features mentioned in Section 13, holders of infrastructure projects not only have their access to the international credit market hampered, but also expose themselves to a greater amount of risks related to exchange rate variation, when indispensable inputs need to be imported. Under the New Foreign Exchange Law, those holders of infrastructure projects will have access to new sources of financing at a global level and will also be able to coordinate complex operations of revenues and expenses under the same exchange rate indexer, particularly when the transaction involves a counterpart qualified as an exporter.
The effect of mitigating foreign exchange risk on infrastructure projects was expressly contemplated by item VIII of the same Section 13 of the new law, by additionally enabling payments in foreign currency "in the situations provided for in the regulations issued by the National Monetary Council, when the stipulation in foreign currency can mitigate foreign exchange risk or increase the efficiency of the business".
In these respects, the New Foreign Exchange Law makes the regulatory approach to foreign exchange operations more flexible, by delegating the regulation of opportunities for exchange rate indexation of legal transactions governed by Brazilian law to BCB and CMN, which will allow greater agility in the provision of relevant standards to keep up with market dynamics. At the same time, the new law already contains, with regard to some opportunities in the infrastructure sector, objective parameters which, in principle, will not require further regulation from monetary authorities. In conclusion, real transformations of contractual modeling are expected, not only in consolidated sectors, such as energy, but also in more incipient ones, such as railways, ports and basic sanitation, to keep just a few examples.
- Category: Restructuring and insolvency
The changes brought about by Law No. 14,112/20 to Law No. 11,101/05 (which deals with judicial reorganization, extrajudicial reorganization, and bankruptcy), Law No. 10,522/02 (which regulates the informational registry of unpaid debts of federal agencies and entities) and Law No. 8,929/94 (which institutes the Rural Product Note) came into effect at the end of January of 2021.
The president of Brazil had vetoed 14 points of Law No. 14,112/20, but on March 17, 2021, the Brazilian Congress overrode 12 of the 14 vetoes. The vetoes related to the provisions that governed (i) the possibility for the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply to define which events could be characterized as unforeseeable circumstances and force majeure for the purposes of any submission of debts and guarantees linked to Rural Product Notes (CPRs), with physical settlement, to judicial reorganization, and (ii) suspension of labor executions against co-obligors of debtors in possession were maintained.
In this article we present an updated comparison of the original wording of Law No. 11,101/05 with the new wording in force. The main changes relate to:
- legal certainty and “super priority” in relation to the granting of loans during judicial reorganization;
- legal certainty and modification of some of the asset sale rules;
- cross-border bankruptcy and cooperation between domestic and foreign courts in such cases;
- more expeditious bankruptcy in terms of sale of assets and extinguishment of obligations, with changes also to articles 83 and 84 of Law 11,101/05, which regulate the list of in bankruptcy and extra-bankruptcy creditors, respectively;
- impossibility of extending the effects of bankruptcy;
- general rules for extrajudicial reorganization, with the possibility of including labor claims and reducing the quorum required for approval of the plan;
- installment payment of debts with the Federal Government and other tax matters; and
- judicial reorganization of rural producers.
Besides the points above, among the vetoes rejected by the Brazilian Congress was the change in Law No. 8,929/94, more specifically in article 11, head paragraph, to expressly provide that claims and security interests linked to CPRs with physical settlement, in the event of partial or full advance of the price, or also representing an exchange operation for inputs (barter) shall not be subject to the effects of judicial reorganization. The new wording of the article also establishes that the creditor continues to be entitled to the restitution of such assets that are in the possession of the issuer of the note or any third party, except for reasons of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure that can be proven to prevent the partial or total fulfillment of the delivery of the product.
In the event of doubt, Machado Meyer's debt restructuring and bankruptcy and tax teams are at your disposal.
Partners of the Restructuring team responsible for this newsletter: Renata Oliveira and Renato Maggio.
Partner of the Tax team responsible for this newsletter: Bruna Marrara.
| analysis of the main changes | |
| LAW NO. 11,101/05 BEFORE LAW NO. 14,112/20 |
LAW NO. 11,101/05 AFTER LAW NO. 14,112/20 |
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Prior finding
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Prior finding
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Stay period
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Stay period
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Verification and registration of claims
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Verification and registration of claims
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Labor claims
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Labor claims
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Tax issues
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Tax issues
(i) revenue will not be taxed by PIS and Cofins; (ii) the gain may be fully offset against tax losses from prior years, without the limitation of 30%.
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Role of the judicial trustee
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Role of the judicial trustee
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Means of judicial reorganization
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Means of judicial reorganization
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DIP financing
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DIP financing
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| Consolidation | Consolidation |
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Partner or supporting creditor
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Partner or supporting creditor
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Matched transactions and derivatives
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Matched transactions and derivatives
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Sale of assets
Third party in good faith: no express provision in Law No. 11,101/05 protecting their interests. |
Sale of assets
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Alternative plan proposed by the creditors
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Alternative plan proposed by the creditors
The alternative plan will only apply to judicial reorganizations filed after the entry into force of Law No. 14,112/20. |
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GMC
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GMC
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Abusive vote
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Abusive vote
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Judicial reorganization of a rural producer
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Judicial reorganization of a rural producer
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Possibility for the tax authorities to file for bankruptcy of the debtor
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Possibility for the tax authorities to file for bankruptcy of the debtor
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Closing of the judicial reorganization
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Closing of the judicial reorganization
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Extrajudicial reorganization
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Extrajudicial reorganization
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Fresh start
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Fresh start
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Extension of the effects of the bankruptcy
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Extension of the effects of the bankruptcy
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List of creditors in bankruptcy
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List of creditors in bankruptcy
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Rapid closure of bankruptcy in the event of absence of assets
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Rapid closure of bankruptcy in the event of absence of assets
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Sale of assets in bankruptcy
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Sale of assets in bankruptcy
Pursuant to a resolution passed under article 42, creditors may obtain the assets sold in bankruptcy or acquire them through the formation of a company, fund, or other investment vehicle, with the participation, if necessary, of the debtor's current shareholders or third parties, or through the conversion of debt into capital. |
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Extinguishment of the obligations of the debtor
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Extinguishment of the obligations of the debtor
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Assignment of claim
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Assignment of claim
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Prevention of the court
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Prevention of the court
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Dividend distribution
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Dividend distribution
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Application of the Code of Civil Procedure
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Application of the Code of Civil Procedure
The Judiciary must give priority to bankruptcy proceedings over the others, except for habeas corpus and the priorities established in special laws. |
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Conciliation, mediation, and arbitration
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Conciliation, mediation, and arbitration
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Transnational Bankruptcy
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Transnational Bankruptcy
On May 18, 2021, the Brazilian Judicial Review Board, in its 331st ordinary session, unanimously approved a resolution related to Normative Act 0001834-33.2021.2.00.0000, which internalizes the Judicial Insolvency Network (JIN), an international agreement with rules for cooperation and direct communication with foreign bankruptcy courts.[1]
[1] At the time of drafting of this article, the resolution had not yet been published. According to information on the CNJ website, "the communications must be recorded and all parties involved should be aware of them. (...) Another novelty that the agreement will allow is for a court to authorize a party or interested parties to present their case and be heard by a foreign court, provided that the decision is endorsed by the court indicated. In addition, the judge may authorize the party or interested parties in proceedings taking place in another country to appear and be heard, without there being any change in the jurisdiction over the case.” https://www.cnj.jus.br/justica-internaliza-tratado-de-comunicacao-em-insolvencia-internacional/ (accessed on May 19, 2021) |
[1] At the time of drafting of this article, the resolution had not yet been published. According to information on the CNJ website, "the communications must be recorded and all parties involved should be aware of them. (...) Another novelty that the agreement will allow is for a court to authorize a party or interested parties to present their case and be heard by a foreign court, provided that the decision is endorsed by the court indicated. In addition, the judge may authorize the party or interested parties in proceedings taking place in another country to appear and be heard, without there being any change in the jurisdiction over the case.” https://www.cnj.jus.br/justica-internaliza-tratado-de-comunicacao-em-insolvencia-internacional/ (accessed on May 19, 2021)